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Introduction
There is a large body of literature, both Soviet and non-Soviet, addressing Soviet foreign
trade. Yet little is known today about how Soviet foreign trade related to the domestic monetary economy.
Soviet authorities released almost no monetary and financial data for most of the Soviet era. Balance-of-payments data in both rubles and a hard currency (e.g. US dollars)
that would permit comparison were not available after 1938 (Wiles, 1968) . Moreover, state budget data typically omitted financial flows related to foreign economic activities such as export subsidies and import taxes. Gosbank (which played a combined role of both central bank and commercial bank) and Foreign Trade Bank (which conducted foreign exchange transactions) only released scant amounts of financial data and information about their activities (Powell, 1972; .
The recent opening of Soviet archival materials to the public creates fascinating opportunities for researchers. This paper takes some of these newly available economic data to perform an empirical analysis of the relationship between foreign trade and domestic financial flows in the Soviet economy.
The focus here is Soviet special foreign trade earnings (SFEs), which generated approximately 7-15% of the Soviet state's budgetary revenues in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 1 ). Economists intensely discussed the economic nature of SFEs in the final decades of the USSR (Birman, 1980 (Birman, , 1981 (Birman, , 1986 Lawson, 1988; Nove, 1986; Shiryaev, 1974; Smirnov, 1978; Volkov, 1972; Wolf, 1985 Wolf, , 1987 Wolf, , 1988a Wolf, , 1988b , but these discussions tended to focus on whether it was proper to include SFEs in value added.
The monetary aspect of SFEs, in contrast, never received much attention. While the connection of SFEs and the money supply appears to have been well recognized, the lack of data rendered it difficult to explore the relationship quantitatively. 1 The assumption was that SFEs largely corresponded to redistribution of existing domestic funds and not to net changes in the financial assets of the government and state enterprises. This view prevailed because Soviet foreign trade balances in foreign currency, which should closely track changes in Gosbank's net foreign assets, were small relative to Produced National Income (PNI). 2 Accordingly, the net financial assets or liabilities of the government and state enterprises were only seen as changing to the extent Gosbank's net foreign assets changed. Indeed, if we look at this situation from Gosbank's perspective, the supply of money or credit could only change to the extent of the change in its foreign assets. Prior to recent availability of data, however, this intuition was difficult to confirm quantitatively.
Although uncertainties remain, this study quantifies the ratio of changes in net foreign assets to SFEs.
Given the ambiguous financial independence of state-owned enterprises, the ratio of the change in net foreign assets to SFEs is important in understanding the Soviet macroeconomic flow of funds. While the government was basically in charge of financing stateowned enterprises, it also could levy any amount of export and import tax it wanted on state enterprises. Taxation resulted in redistribution of funds across the government and state enterprises and obviously boosted government revenue. Less apparent, however, is how this redistribution influenced the financial positions of the government and state enterprises. As there was no financial market to which Soviet enterprises could go to freely raised funds for such purposes, the state budget financed both fixed investment and standardized liquid assets of enterprises, including the financing of imports. Thus, it is possible that the government eventually had to compensate state enterprises -directly or indirectly -for taxes levied.
What is certain is that only a small part of the redistribution of SFEs that corresponded to the changes in the net foreign assets actually altered the net financial assets of this government/state-enterprise system. Therefore, our basic task here is to quantify the share of SFEs that correspond to changes in net foreign assets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the institutional backgrounds of Soviet foreign trade, Soviet banking, and the mechanism for determining SFEs for the successive analysis. The description is based on Soviet foreign trade institutions as they existed between the 1950s and 1987, the year liberalization of foreign trade commenced (Zverev, 1990) . Historical trends in Soviet foreign trade and SFE schemes are mostly omitted. Section 3 explicates the method and data used in this 2 The roughly synonymous concepts of produced national income (PNI) and net material product (NMP) correspond to the SNA's GNP concept in the following way: NMP = GNP -consumption of fixed capitalvalue-added of the service sector (UN, 1977; . 
BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition

Soviet foreign trade and the money supply
The Soviet Union had a single official exchange rate (see Wiles, 1968, pp. 130─131) . Foreign currency transactions were converted to rubles using the official exchange rate and recorded in the accounts of the Soviet banking system (Zverev, 1990, pp. 59, 136) . However, the official exchange rate did not have a function to relate world market prices to Soviet domestic prices. Typically, the Soviet domestic price of a good significantly differed from the price of the good that was calculated from its world market price and the official exchange rate (Treml and Kostinsky, 1982; Hanson, 2003, p. 201) .
For the purposes of discussion, we refer here to the ruble price calculated from the foreign currency price and the official exchange rate as the price in valuta rubles. If we consider, say, a particular good already priced in domestic rubles, 3 the authorities would adjust for the difference between the price of the good in valuta rubles and domestic rubles using a price equalization mechanism for allocating import and export subsidies and collecting import and export taxes. Equation (1) models this mechanism at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels (Smirnov, 1960, pp. 345─363; Wolf, 1988b, pp. 5─6; Zverev, 1990, pp. 42─43, 136) : Note that the term "special foreign trade earnings" and its variants are sometimes used in other studies to refer to the gross output of foreign trade. The gross output of foreign trade that constituted PNI was another unique aspect of the Soviet economy (Treml et 3 Valuta ruble is also referred to as "foreign-exchange ruble" or "foreign-trade ruble" in other publications. The terms are interchangeable.
Yasushi Nakamura
Soviet foreign trade and the money supply 8 al. Quigley, 1974, pp. 103─126; Smirnov, 1978; Treml and Kostinsky, 1982; Zverev, 1990, p. 107) . SFEs and the gross output of foreign trade are closely related, but distinct, concepts. The term SFE here refers to fiscal revenues (or expenditures) that result from the price equalization mechanism, not to the gross output of foreign trade. We discuss the gross output of foreign trade in more detail in sub-section 3.3.
To understand the price equalization mechanism, consider a situation involving This price equalization mechanism ensured the state's monopoly on foreign exchange, which the Soviet authorities regarded as a major achievement of the socialist economy (Pozdnyakov, 1969; Quigley, 1974; Berman and Bustin, 1975; Zverev, 1989, pp. 9─10 ). In particular, FTOs and domestic enterprises never directly handled foreign currency or currency exchange. Foreign exchange flows were instead institutionally separate from domestic ruble flows. The domestic relative price system was also insulated from the relative price system of the world market, even if a single official exchange rate existed.
Despite the complicated settlement procedure for foreign trade transactions, the relationship between foreign exchange flows and the domestic money supply in the Soviet Zverev, 1989, p. 31) . This simplification does not significantly impede our analysis, however, as other Soviet domestic institutional sectors had almost no involvement with the price equalization Accordingly, the funds for purchasing imports, including the tax payment, should have previously been allocated under the economic plan (see Quigley, 1974, pp. 163; Podshiva-lenko, 1983, pp. 137─142; Shelikhov and Zelikman, 1984, pp. 82, 302─310; Zverev, 1990, pp. 40, 105─107) . It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the enterprises used their own funds for any substantial share of import payments (including import taxes).
The only potential instances where enterprises might have been required or allowed to use their own funds were in decentralized, small-scale investment projects not included in the state capital investment plan (see Zverev, 1990, pp. 112─124) . While data on such decentralized imports are unavailable, the quantities of decentralized imports could not have been very large as the share of decentralized investment projects in total capital investment was negligible. The state capital investment plan covered over 85% of the total capital investment on average during the period from 1959 to 1985 (Narkhoz 1985, p. 363) .
The difference between state capital investment and total capital investment primarily reflected investments by households and collective farms. Productive decentralized investment accounted for a small fraction of the difference. 
Using Equation (1), we rewrite:
Equation (2) 3 Method and data
Method
Our aim is to quantify the relation of SFEs to net changes in foreign assets. For convenience, we define the cover ratio, CR, as:
where CR denotes the cover ratio in percentage terms. Other notations follow those in (Gekker, 1967; Zverev, 1989, p. 23) . This also may explain why the activities of foreign banks funded with Soviet capital such as Moskovskii Narodnyi Bank in London and the Bank Severnyi Evropy in Paris seemed so inscrutable to outsiders. Given that the information necessary to obtain a better picture of Soviet foreign currency flows, especially balance-of-payments data, are unavailable (see Wiles, 1968, pp. 81─122) , it is difficult to say much about such offshore foreign exchange transactions. required that the issue of accumulated imbalances in intra-CMEA trade be settled once and for all (Lavigne, 1990) . What became soon apparent in this final settlement was that it was unclear how foreign governments were supposed to repay such debts or whether they
should repay them at all. This uncertainty may explain why CFGs were excluded from Gosbank's foreign currency assets. More to the point, this lack of resolution makes it difficult to decide if we should include CFGs in foreign assets. In the spirit of equanimity, we consider both net foreign asset series that with and without CFGs. show that foreign transactions of Foreign Trade Bank were insignificant before 1961. Indeed, the consolidation of the balance sheets of these two banks increased Gosbank's foreign settlement account balance by a mere 7 million rubles, or 0.01% of Gosbank's balance sheet total after consolidation. Gosbank's balance sheet total actually decreased by 9 mil- Source: See Table 1 .
SFEs and the foreign trade balances in domestic rubles
The official data on foreign trade balances in domestic rubles, M d and E d , are available for the 1950s and after the mid─1970s (see Table 1 ). SFE can be calculated from
and E s . For the period when the data on SFEs are unavailable, we use the official series of customs tax revenues and GOF. These data have also become available recently (see Table   1 ). Figure 4 provides the series for SFE, customs taxes, and GOF as percentages of total state budget revenue. CR will be underestimated if we use the customs tax figure instead of SFE in Equation (2).
A calculation using the available data presented in Table 1 shows that customs tax revenues were 38% to 122% larger than SFE. The customs tax series, nevertheless, provides an upper bound for the quantity of SFE. Source: See Table 1 .
The gross output of foreign trade, GOF, is defined as:
where a denotes the adjustment coefficient defined as (Treml et al., 1972, pp. 147─180; Holzman, 1974, pp. 317─346; UN, 1977, pp. 35─36; Treml and Kostinsly, 1982, p. 8; UN, 1989, pp. 28─31; UN, 1996, pp. 214─5) .
The remaining notation is the same as in Equation (1). For Equations (1) and (4) other words, Equation (1) can be regarded as a special case of Equation (4) in which the adjustment coefficient has a fixed value of one.
It is unclear how consistently and strictly the Soviets applied Equation (4) in calculating GOF. Equation (4) was adopted as the standard GOF calculation method in the Material Product System (the Soviet national accounting system) in the latter half of the 1950s (Smirnov, 1978) . Even after Equation (4) was introduced in the Soviet Union, most socialist countries apparently continued to use simpler methods of calculating GOF, such as Equation (2) (a=1) and (Shiryaev, 1974; Smirnov, 1978 The economic nature of GOF was once intensely discussed. Wolf (1985; 1987; 1988b) demonstrates that GOF was regarded as an import tax, so it is appropriate to include import taxes in calculations of value added. The national accounting system for the market economies, the SNA (System of National Accounts), includes import taxes in value added. This understanding seems essentially valid. However, the adjustment coefficient, a, (SNA 1968, paragraph 6.3; SNA 1993, paragraph 6.235). 6 If the adjustment coefficient a in Equation (4) ports and imports are measured in valuta rubles, a value for GOF equivalent to the net import tax should be included in the extended concept of the value added VA+GOF. We can also define the balance between the domestic supply and domestic use of goods as
VA+GOF=A holds by definition. This exercise shows that it is possible to produce methodologically consistent definitions of the goods balance if the adjustment coefficient a is fixed at either zero or one.
Once the adjustment coefficient a, which by definition can only be quantified expost and macroeconomically, is introduced, it becomes difficult to conceive of a methodologically consistent definition of the goods balance. Wolf (1987, pp. 127─128) acknowledges the role of the adjustment coefficient was unclear. Smirnov (1978) demonstrates that the purpose of the adjustment coefficient was to revalue the macroeconomic benefits (or costs) of net exports (or imports) by converting the benefits (or the costs) from valuta rubles into domestic rubles. Kuboniwa (2007 Kuboniwa ( , 2012a and Tabata (1989) offer a highly plausible explanation of the adjustment coefficient based on the similarity between Equation (4) and the definition of trading gains in the SNA (SNA 1993, pp. 509─510). These explanations and interpretations of the adjustment coefficient, however, do not change the fundamental difficulty of defining a balance between the supply and use of goods under Equation (4) except for the cases where a is fixed at zero or one.
Fortunately, the vagueness in the concept of GOF does not seriously impede using the GOF series as a proxy for our SFE series. Figure 4 confirms that the differences between the GOF and SFE are relatively small. This reflects the fact that the foreign trade balance in valuta rubles was small relative to the foreign trade balance in domestic rubles.
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Comparing GOF and SFE values in the years when both values were available, the differences between the SFE and GOF, which may be defined as (GOF−SFE)/SFE, ranged from ─3.0% to 11.8%. The simple average was 4.8%, excluding one negative figure of ─3.0%
in 1966 (see Table 1 ). The data on GOF also show that GOF figures estimated by the Western and Soviet economists are not significantly different from official GOF figures (see Table 1 notes). 
Results
Figure 5
Cover ratio CR calculated according to its several definitions (%) ΔNFA/GOF, respectively. Note that the CR value was considered to be zero in this calculation of the average value if the CR value is negative. Note also, as we see in Figure 5 , that the number of sample years across series differs. The result that the CR was tiny is robust, regardless of the series used for the calculation. Moreover, in most years, the sign of CR shifts, depending on whether foreign assets include credits to foreign governments, CFG, or not. Thus, we need to know the economic nature of CFG more in detail to identify the ultimate financial impacts of foreign trade on the government/state-enterprise system.
Discussion
This study confirmed earlier assessments that Soviet special foreign trade earnings (SFEs) mainly involved redistribution of existing domestic funds. This result does not conflict with the fact that foreign exchange flows were significant in Soviet economic development. Foreign borrowing following the advent of detente in the early 1970s and the surge of oil export revenues after the 1973 oil shock sharply increased foreign currency inflows into the Soviet economy (Holzman, 1976, pp. 159─170; Garvy, 1977, pp. 147─151; Nove, 1992, pp. 391─393) . Increased foreign currency inflows, in turn, enabled the Soviet Union to import more goods without increasing export volumes. This situation undoubtedly helped prolong the life of the Soviet regime (IMF et al., 1991, p. 119; Hanson, 2003, pp. 119─124, 154─162).
The Soviet economy gained the benefits of trade by spending its foreign currency earnings obtained through oil exports and through foreign borrowing. In this sense, the USSR would have enjoyed its windfall with or without SFEs. This is hardly surprising given that it is generally possible to increase or decrease import and export taxes independent of the country's foreign trade balance.
In reality, SFEs increased. Imports that increased both in nominal and real terms clearly extended the tax base of SFEs. Exports that increased mostly in nominal terms with rising world oil prices also extended the tax base. The SFE tax rate on export sales, defined SFEs import and export tax components (ratios in % and RUB billion)
Notes: Import and export taxes are defined as Md−Ms and Es−Ed, respectively. The import and export tax ratios are defined as the import tax ratio = (Md−Ms)•100/Ms and the export tax ratio = (Es−Ed)•100/Ed, respectively. A negative figure of export tax indicates export subsidy. A negative export tax ratio can be interpreted as the export subsidy ratio.
Source: See Table 1 The ultimate financial impact of rising SFEs on the government/state-enterprise system remains unclear, due to the lack of information on financial relationships within the gov- For the entire Soviet economy, it is obvious that a net change in its financial assets due to foreign trade is subject to the corresponding change in net foreign assets measured in valuta rubles. We confirmed that the magnitude of SFEs is only partially and indirectly related to the changes in net foreign assets of the Soviet economy as a whole. The Soviet enterprise sector drove the increases in Soviet state budget revenues; Soviet foreign trade contributed quite little in this respect.
SFEs were principally generated by differences in the relative price systems of the Soviet economy and the world market. Soviet enterprises that made economic decisions exclusively in terms of Soviet domestic prices did not gain or lose from these differences.
They purchased imports at Soviet domestic prices and sold exports at Soviet domestic prices. These transactions generated neither additional earnings nor additional losses for them in terms of the Soviet domestic prices. The Soviet government collected a portion of their payments for imports and their revenues from exports, and paid them for a portion of their sales of exports. These transactions mostly involve redistribution of existing domestic funds. Foreign economic agents neither gained additional revenues nor faced additional outlays from foreign trade transactions with the Soviet Union as long as they conducted their trade at world market prices. If foreign trade transactions are valued only at Soviet domestic prices or at world market prices, SFEs vanish except with respect to ordinary import and export taxes. In this sense, SFEs reflect the magnitude of the deviation of the relative price systems in the world market and the Soviet economy. It was, nevertheless, the aim of the Soviet regime to separate foreign and domestic relative price systems (see Wolf, 1988b, pp. 9─12; Zverev, 1990, p. 30) . If the Soviet system had adopted world market 
